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ABSTRACT
The talents and efforts of scientists and technicians in
the People's Republic of China are essential to the
modernization of that country. Demand for their assistance,
however, far exceeds their ability to provide it. In order to
ensure a rational distribution of scientific and technical
(S&T) skills in this situation of scarcity, S&T graduates are
allocated to work units by a planned job assignment system.
Nevertheless, many of China's scientists and technicians are
matched to jobs that poorly suit their training or tastes.
Moreover, there are few means for them to transfer to another
job after receiving an assignment.
If it is reasonable to assume that the scarcity of S&T
talent will not soon be resolved and that the job assignment
system will continue as a means of allocating S&T talent in
this situation of scarcity, then it is worthwhile to learn how
scientists and technicians can be better matched to jobs.
Improved information, coordination, and communication would
lead to better matches. Any technical solution must, however,
be implemented in view of the conflicting objectives of
individuals and groups involved in job assignments. Therefore,
in an attempt to understand the forces shaping the outcomes of
the job assignment process, this thesis analyzes the conflicts
within and among the participants.
The analysis of the conflicts offered here reveals a
complex pattern of authority and exchange mechanisms. These
mechanisms tighten and loosen as groups and individuals compete
to exercise or expand their ability to achieve objectives. The
dual processes of authority and exchange within the job
assignment system provide different incentives and account for
some of the unintended outcomes in the job assignment system.
Methods of refining this approach, as well as an alternative
approach, are proposed for further study of this system.
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1. INTRODUCTION
China's ambitious plans for modernization in the late 20th
century are dependent upon its attempts to integrate
scientific and technological research with economic production.
As a part of these efforts, China's top leadership has
explicitly stated its desire to promote the full use of
scientific and technical personnel (WHITE PAPER 1986: 13-14).
Given the serious shortage of scientists and technicians to
meet the country's needs, these persons might be optimally
employed. The institutional means for assigning them to jobs
after they graduate, however, often put them where they do not
want to be and perhaps do not belong.
Because of the disequilibrium in the supply and demand for
scientific and technical (S&T) talent in the People's Republic
of China (PRC), the state has attempted to achieve a balance
through a planned allocation system of job assignments. This
system is designed to allocate S&T talent in accordance with
state plans for development of targeted regions in the interior
and countryside, as well as targeted projects and sectors
(ECKSTEIN 1978: 140; ORLEANS 1986: 8). The outcome in many
cases is, however, a poor match between graduates and jobs.
The concept of a good match has both macro- and micro-
level aspects which are measurable by fairly objective
criteria. A good match occurs in a macro sense when the
required numbers of S&T personnel in a given field are assigned
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to regions and sectors so that a surplus does not result in one
and a shortage in another. In a micro sense, a good match
results when a scientist or technician is assigned to a job
that suitably matches his or her training. A good match at the
micro level can also be said to occur when a job assignment
matches the preferences of a scientist or technician. This
last aspect is, however, subjective and therefore difficult to
measure. Moreover, it complicates measurement of matching or
mismatching. For example, a person may be well suited to a job
assignment because of his or her training, but the job location
may not suit his or her preferences. If this last situation is
not a strict mismatch per se, it nonetheless deserves attention
if it lowers the morale and productivity of scarce S&T talent.
A few qualifications to this study are needed. First,
although S&T personnel are assigned to non-state sector, as
well as state sector, work units, this study focuses mainly on
mismatches in the initial assignment of these persons to state
sector jobs. Much of the literature on S&T personnel concerns
those in the state sector; all of the interviewees with whom I
spoke were also state sector employees.
Second, although this thesis focuses largely on mismatches
in the initial job assignment, mismatches can also occur later
in a person's career. A person who is well matched to a job
initially may become mismatched later when knowledge in his or
her field has changed rapidly but the person has not been
retrained; when a person does not learn on the job as quickly
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as others or learns more quickly; or when state plans change so
that his or her work unit is no longer targeted by the state
and its personnel become underemployed.
Finally, it is very important also to note that this
thesis focuses upon the shortcomings of the job assignment
process and does not discuss its positive aspects. Assuredly,
the system functions well in many respects, as evidenced by the
remarkable strides in science and technology that the PRC has
made in the past 40 years. I focus on the shortcomings in
order to understand how Chinese scientists and technicians
might be more appropriately trained and employed in order to
satisfy both the development needs of their country as well as
their own personal needs.
The precise extent to which PRC scientists and technicians
are mismatched to their jobs probably cannot be known. If
judged from the considerable attention of Chinese policy and
the Chinese press to this situation, then it undoubtedly exists
on a scale that demands correction. Estimates of that scale
are suggested by two recent surveys. One survey of over 10,000
specialist technical personnel in Shanghai (KEJI RIBAO 1987a)
revealed that 19.8 percent of these persons are assigned to
jobs not particularly suited to their training; that 16.5
percent are unsatisfied with their job even though it suitably
matches their training; and that 25.2 percent have no tasks or
are not fully engaged. Another survey of over 30,000 middle-
aged technical people conducted nationwide in more than 500
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enterprises (RENMIN RIBAO OVERSEAS EDITION 1986) showed that
11.2 percent are not used effectively at all. The latter
survey does not, however, attribute any causes for these
mismatches.
In regard to macro-level mismatches, there are numerous
recent reports on the imbalanced distribution of scientists and
technicians among different regions and sectors in China.
These reports usually describe a scarcity of S&T talent in the
countryside, interior, small enterprises, applied work, and the
currently targeted sectors of energy, transportation,
communications, and materials; or a surplus in large
enterprises, large cities, basic research, and traditional
heavy industries (GUANGMING RIBAO 1986a; 1986b; BEIJING REVIEW
1984, 1985; KEXUEXUE YU KEXUE JISHU GUANLI 1987a; YANG 1986;
WHITE PAPER 1986: 116).
In order to correct this situation of mismatching (or to
"rationalize the flow of S&T talent," as the Chinese refer to
the situation), the state has introduced new reform policies in
recent years to complement the planned allocation of talent by
the state. Despite the ostensible increase in opportunities
for better matches and greater mobility provided by the
reforms, reports of mismatches persist (JILIN S&T COMMISSION
1987).
Why do these mismatches result from a planned system that
is designed to prevent them? What do these unintended outcomes
of a planned system reveal about its mechanisms? Are answers
9
to these questions generalizable to Chinese workers outside the
S&T sector? What does the process by which the scientists and
technologists are matched to jobs imply for the further
development of China? Finally, how does a better understanding
of this process assist that development?
One way to approach these questions is to analyze the
weaknesses in the centralized planning system, such as
inadequate forecasting of labor requirements, insufficient
collection and processing of information, and slack
verification of requests for S&T talent by work units. This
approach assumes, however, that all participants in the job
assignment process share a uniformity of interests and that
enhanced technical planning methods are sufficient for solving
mismatches. It disregards the possibility that groups and
individuals may have conflicting interests and that mismatches
may result when each pursues his or her own objectives within
the assignment process.
The shortcomings of this approach suggest another method,
which is to examine precisely what each group participating in
job assignments for Chinese scientists and technicians wants
from that process. The groups involved are the state
(represented by the State Education Commission, Ministry of
Labor and Personnel, State Planning Commission, State Economic
Commission, and State Science and Technology Commission), the
work units (represented by their administrative and party
cadres), and the corps of scientists and technicians
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themselves. The universities and other institutions of higher
education, from which the S&T contingent graduates, also play
an important role that needs to be examined. Conflicts occur
within and among these groups over the objectives that they
hope to achieve from the job allocation system.
In the hope that the information uncovered by this latter
approach will clarify how state and work unit authorities might
and might not effectively control the flow of S&T talent, I
shall focus on these conflicts as a first step in analyzing the
particular forces shaping the job assignment process.
Not having access to government ministers, work place
authorities, or university staff, I have analyzed the conflicts
in job assignments as revealed to me by a small number of
scientists and engineers from the PRC who are in the United
States (see Appendix). My analysis is based upon a small body
of data collected from interviews with these men and women.
These interviews were balanced with a review of selected PRC
documents and related articles by scholars outside China.1 The
privileged background and superior education of most of the
scientists and engineers with whom I spoke are undoubtedly
1 Especially useful were the "White Paper," a 1986
analysis of major science and technology policies of the
Chinese Communist Party and PRC government since the Chinese
reforms began in late 1978; and Leo Orleans' 1986 paper,
"Reforms and Innovations in the Utilization of China's
Scientific and Engineering Talent." I am indebted to Mr.
Orleans for having granted me permission to use his paper for
my research.
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atypical of the "average" scientist or engineer back in China.
Possible biases are described in the appendix to this paper.
Nonetheless, many of the thoughts of these temporarily U.S.-
based Chinese scientists and engineers regarding their jobs are
probably shared widely among their colleagues in China. What
the interviewees, supported by the documents, reveal about
their own objectives, as well as their interpretation of the
objectives of government officials, work unit authorities, and
university staff, can serve as a starting point for further
examination of the logic of the outcomes of the job assignment
system for Chinese scientists and technicians.
In the remainder of this paper, I first review some of the
background information on China's scientists and technicians
and the job assignment system; second, I describe the
objectives that each group seeks in the assignment system and
how the system can assist or foil them in achieving their
objectives; third, I examine the conflicts within and among the
groups and how these conflicts prevent better matches of
scientists and technicians; and finally, I attempt to answer
questions raised by this study.
12
2. BACKGROUND
In order to understand any explanation for the mismatches
between China's scientists and technicians and their jobs, I
first review briefly four topics: scarcity of S&T personnel,
importance of the initial job assignment, process of the job
assignment system, and introduction of reforms into this
system.
2.1 SCARCITY OF S&T PERSONNEL
China's total science and technology contingent, numbering
7.8 million at the end of 1985, includes 3.4 million engineers,
450,000 agricultural technicians, 336,000 research scientists,
2.2 million medical personnel, and 1.5 million mathematicians
(WHITE PAPER 1986: 315). Statistics for the S&T contingent in
1984 show that 45 percent hold first degrees from a higher
institution and 41 percent hold degrees from vocational schools
(WHITE PAPER 1986: 317). The number holding graduate degrees
is presumed to be relatively small. Only nine out of every
10,000 Chinese are enrolled in higher education, ranking China
113th in this regard among all nations (WHITE PAPER 1986: 315).
Although the number of scientists and technicians in China
has grown at a rate ten times faster than that of the
population as a whole since the founding of the PRC in 1949
(DONG and CHEN: 1), the demand for these highly skilled
personnel continues to outstrip the supply. This shortage was
13
intensified by the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), which
brought China's higher education to a virtual standstill.
China would have had an additional 0.9 to 1.0 million S&T
personnel aged 30-39 years in 1985 if the Cultural Revolution
had not disrupted education (DONG and CHEN: 8). In 1985, 23.7
percent of China's total S&T contingent were under the age of
30, many of them still students, whereas only 8.8 percent were
in the age 30-39 years cohort (DONG and CHEN: 8). Given the
weakness of China's education system during the Cultural
Revolution, those in this last cohort are not only small in
number but are probably less adequately trained as well.2
2.2 IMPORTANCE OF INITIAL JOB ASSIGNMENT
The importance of the initial job assignment cannot be
overemphasized. In China, a person is generally assigned to a
work unit for lifetime tenure. Although he or she may be
promoted within the work unit, an employee finds it extremely
2 The scarcity of S&T talent certainly is not due to a
lack of interest among Chinese students in pursuing science or
engineering degrees. In the PRC, S&T personnel generally tend
to enjoy (except during past anti-intellectual campaigns) a
more elite social status than do many of their American
counterparts (ORLEANS 1982: 472). Speaking for Chinese
students in general, one interviewee gave the following
reasons, aside from status considerations, for wanting to study
science: it provides employment that is less susceptible than
many other jobs to the vicissitudes of politics (despite past
anti-intellectual campaigns); it allows a person to achieve
accomplishments without using or being used by other people;
and it allows a person always to pursue the "truth"
(Interviewee no. 1 ). If these reasons are widely shared by
other Chinese students, then it seems Chinese attitudes about
science and technology, as well as about S&T personnel, may
differ from American attitudes in some striking ways.
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difficult to transfer out of it. Quitting is equally unlikely.
The state-run job bureaus only assign a person to a job once.
If a person refuses an assignment or quits, he or she is
effectively excluded from state sector employment, which
generally provides better welfare benefits than any other type
of employment. (see WALDER 1983: 56-57)
Much of the difficulty in transferring can be attributed
to the hoarding of employees by work unit cadres. Kornai
provides an economic motive for such hoarding in his analysis
of the traditional socialist firm that is always kept solvent
by the state:
Accordingly, its demand is hardly constrained by solvency
considerations. The firm, as buyer, tries to acquire as
much input as possible in order that shortage should not
hinder production. (KORNAI 1980: 28-29)
A cadre may thus attempt to prevent the transfer of a highly
trained, but underutilized, employee because the cost of his or
her labor will ultimately be paid by the state. Furthermore,
in a situation of scarce S&T talent, a similarly highly skilled
person may be hard to find if and when he or she is finally
needed.
Once assigned, Chinese state-sector employees are
dependent upon their work unit for far more than just their
wages. The work unit also provides housing, ration coupons for
consumer goods and some foodstuffs, medical care, labor
insurance, welfare, social security, and other important goods
and services (WALDER 1983: 53-54). As Walder points out,
employee dependence is heightened not only by the lack of
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markets for many of these goods and services, but also by the
lack of alternative employment of a comparable sort. Even
across state-sector work units, these benefits vary enough to
make a noticeable difference in a person's standard of living.
Everyone wants to be assigned to a work unit that offers the
best possible conditions.
2.3 THE JOB ASSIGNMENT SYSTEM
The PRC has had a huge gap between supply and demand for
scientific and technical talent since its founding in 1949.
Given the ideological and economic impossibility of allocating
this scarce human resource according to the very high wages it
could command in an open labor market, the state devised a
centralized allocation system that has been used, with various
modifications, since the early 1950s (ECKSTEIN 1978: 139-42).
Although I was unable to find a complete description of this
system, a partial description by Eckstein written after the
tumultuous Cultural Revolution in 1978 states that it was
V...unclear how the manpower planners made their assignment
decisions, what criteria were used for determining priorities,
and what principles governed the rationing of scarce manpower"
(ECKSTEIN 1978: 140).
My interviews with Chinese scientists and engineers in the
United States revealed more about the operation of this system
than I could find in the literature. The system is complicated
by being split among the different levels of the national hier-
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archy. Which level of government assigns a graduate to a job
depends on the institution from which he or she graduates.
Graduates of institutions directly under the State Education
Commission are assigned by the central ministries, graduates of
provincial institutions are assigned by provincial authorities,
and so on down the national hierarchy. Although interviews and
written sources indicate that the system is modified fairly
frequently, this hierarchical organization seems to remain
constant (ECKSTEIN 1978: 139-42; ORLEANS 1986; SIMON 1987:
143).
I relate here a description of the allocation system
provided by one of the interviewees. Although his description
differs from others in regard to precisely which ministries,
commissions, or positions perform which functions, no two
sources of information were entirely consistent in this regard;
however, his description was relatively consistent with all
others regarding the levels at which decisions are made.
This particular interviewee (no. 1) described the
centralized allocation system for university graduates as
working "like a military process," comparing it to recruitment
into a branch of the military. The key agencies involved in
the early 1980s, he reports, were the Ministry of Education and
the Ministry of Labor and Personnel, which act as a check and
balance on each other.' Eligible work units request new
a The Ministry of Education was elevated to the State
Education Commission, a super-cabinet-level body, in 1986.
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graduates through the Ministry of Labor and Personnel,
specifying the number and type of degree-holders required.
Universities send lists of graduating students to the State
Education Commission. The number of requests received by the
Ministry of Labor and Personnel inevitably exceeds the number
of graduates reported to the State Education Commission. In
1986, for example, work units requested 700,000 new graduates,
of whom only 321,000 existed (ORLEANS 1986: 5). Thus, requests
are prioritized by the Ministry of Labor and Personnel in
accordance with the priorities of central government plans.
Work units may request a particular student and a student
may request a particular work unit, but the entire process is
run with very little, if any, direct contact between work units
and students. According to the same interviewee, the Ministry
of Labor and Personnel hands down a list of positions at
various work units to the university and university staff then
match graduates to the list. A key person in determining the
matches is the banzhuren, an instructor who acts as an academic
and personal advisor for a group of students throughout their
degree program. Often the banzhuren announces all of the
openings to the students and may allow each to list his or her
top two or three choices (Interviewees no. 2 and 4). Although
the banzhuren generally knows the performance, capability,
personality, and preferences of each student, poor matches
sometimes result nevertheless. In making a match, the
banzhuren often has no more information about a work unit other
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than its name and location. For example, a group of 13 civil
engineers (including Interviewee no. 7), were assigned to a
construction work unit on the basis of their degree and the
name of the unit; however, the work unit actually needed
chemical engineers, which they were forced to become. Needless
to say, many graduates are unhappy with their assignments. One
interviewee (no. 1) reported that about one-third of the
graduates at his university attempt to change their assignment
as soon as they receive it from the banzhuren, but very few of
them succeed.
Orleans' description of the allocation system reveals a
somewhat different process:
... graduates of universities under the State
Education Commission are assigned to production
ministries, which then appoint them to their own
bureaus, which place them in companies, which finally
assign them to a specific job in a factory or some
other enterprise. (ORLEANS 1986: 3)
The major difference between these two descriptions seems to be
whether a student is assigned by the banzhuren to a specific
work unit or to a ministry, which, in turn, assigns him or her
to a work unit. It is possible that the job lists handed down
to the universities contain both types of assignments. The
banzhuren may not, however, always play a key role. Some
students are assigned directly by the state without the
involvement of the banzhuren or any other university staff
(ORLEANS 1986: 6).
The enormous complexity of the centralized process of
matching graduates to jobs and the inevitable mismatching that
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results are revealed in the following statement:
Even with the best of intentions (which cannot be
taken for granted), and even if all the necessary
data were available (and they are not), it is impos-
sible for the central government planning institutions
to forecast the enormous and diverse needs of every
economic sector for specialized professional manpower
and then to achieve a precise match between the needs
and the current crop of university and college graduates,
who have already been in the "pipeline" for three, four,
or more years. The process is further complicated by
the hierarchical levels through which an assignment must
pass. (ORLEANS 1986: 3)
The difficulty of conducting such a complex process without
error is recognized by the state, which has added reforms both
to ensure better matches for new graduates and to allow some
adjustment for mismatched graduates assigned in the past.
2.4 REFORMS IN THE JOB ASSIGNMENT SYSTEM
New mechanisms have been added to the job assignment
system in recent years to refine the crudity that sometimes
characterizes its processes. These new mechanisms can be
divided into two types: those that allow the centralized
allocation system to make better initial job assignments, and
those that allow a measure of mobility after the initial job
assignment has been assumed.
2.4.1 Allocation Reforms. Those who seek reforms that allow
the centralized system to make better initial assignments
implicitly assume that the state is capable of directly or
indirectly matching graduates to jobs better than anyone else.
These persons also implicitly assume that graduates will be
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allocated in accordance with state development plans and that
priority projects, sectors, and regions will receive necessary
labor inputs. The results of limited and experimental reforms
show that the state has more difficult time ensuring the
accuracy of the latter assumption when it loosens its authority
over assignments. The certainty of the former assumption is
difficult to know when individual preferences are a criterion
for judging matches.
In 1983, the State Council, China's highest executive
body, approved a set of experimental reforms for the allocation
system, at the same time stressing that assignments may not be
altered or rejected (ORLEANS 1986: 5). First, assignment plans
would be prepared a year in advance in order to allow work
units and universities more time to cooperate (according to
Interviewee no. 1, whose description of the allocation system
is given above, the entire matching process at his university
is generally completed within only a month). Second, the
assigned graduate would undergo a one-year probationary period
within the work unit in order to ensure the suitability of the
match. Third, work units would be allowed to interview and
test graduates before accepting them. The extent to which
these reforms have been implemented is uncertain; Orleans
suggests that direct contact between work units and students
prior to assignment remains extremely limited (ORLEANS 1986:
5-6).
Another set of reforms affecting all graduates, of whom
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science and technology graduates are only a part, were tried in
1985 at most of the higher institutions under the Ministry of
Education. These reforms and their results are noted by
Orleans (ORLEANS 1986: 6-8). Even in this case, it was the
authority of the schools in determining matches that was
expanded, rather than that of the students or work units.
Contacts between schools and employers provided jobs for 63.8
percent of university graduates, whereas 23.6 percent of the
graduates were assigned jobs directly by the state without the
involvement of their university. These reforms were suddenly
reversed the next year when officials discovered that the new
system did not ensure the required flow of graduates into key
projects and into the interior and countryside. In 1986, 69
percent of the graduates were assigned jobs directly by the
state.
This policy shift reveals the conflict between the desire
of the state to ensure sufficient numbers of S&T personnel for
targeted work units and the attempts of the state to ensure
better job matches for S&T personnel through less centralized
hiring decisions. If students had been given more direct
choice over their job assignments in 1985, then it would not be
surprising that targeted work units, especially those in remote
and backward regions, did not receive enough graduates. It
should be noted, however, that this result occurred when
greater authority over assignments was given to the
universities. Why did this result occur? Why should
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universities make assignments different from what the state
would have made? Were the universities able to match graduates
to suitable jobs better than the state could have done? What
criteria should used to compare matches made by the university
with those by the state? Were the universities able and
willing to accommodate the preferences of graduates better than
the state?
The conflict between the desire of the state to assign
some S&T graduates to certain places and the preference of
those graduates to be assigned elsewhere makes it even more
difficult to measure the actual extent of mismatching. Many
graduates are likely to complain about being mismatched to a
job in the interior or countryside just because the location
and its amenities do not suit their tastes. Although, as
Orleans notes, some graduates of prestigious universities may
have unrealistic expectations about where they should be
working, agencies responsible for job assignments should be
especially careful not to waste scarce S&T talent through
faulty job allocations (ORLEANS 1986: 11).
2.4.2 Mobility Reforms. Reforms for mobility are generally
divided among four major types: policies to recruit S&T talent
into undeveloped regions, policies to facilitate personnel
exchanges, policies to develop research contracts, and policies
to promote spare-time work. My categorization of these four
types, based upon Orleans' review of mobility policies, implies
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that the allocation system fails to send and retain enough S&T
personnel in the interior and countryside and that it fails to
produce suitable micro- and macro-level matches consistently.
In 1983 the State Council stated the need for S&T personnel
"to flow from the city to the countryside, from the large
cities to the medium-size and small, from the developed coastal
regions to the frontier, and from overstaffed organizations to
those urgently needing employees" (quoted in ORLEANS 1986: 14).
Thus, reforms for mobility are intended to create flows only in
certain directions. "Mobility," warns a journal article, "does
not mean that an enterprise may recruit people in any way it
wants to, nor may an individual go to work anywhere he wants
to" (quoted in ORLEANS 1986: 13).
Although S&T personnel generally cannot transfer between
state-run work units without the approval of those in charge on
both sides, they can, at least in theory, transfer to
collective work units (which are outside of the state sector)
without the approval of their initial state-run work unit. I
am unable to conclude with certainty, but it seems that small
urban enterprises, especially those in the collective sector,
often are not considered important enough to have a college
graduate assigned to them and thus are not eligible to request
a S&T graduate from the assignment process (ORLEANS 1986: 13).
Many rural collective enterprises apparently face the same
constraint (BEIJING REVIEW 1984, 1985). Recent economic
reforms have, however, allowed some collectives, particularly
24
those in the countryside of prosperous regions, to become
wealthy enough to attract S&T talent away from state-run work
units by offering higher wages. For this reason, the same
journal article whose warning about mobility is quoted above
also asserts that state-run work units require protection to
maintain the stability of their S&T personnel (ORLEANS 1986:
14). Officials who desire more liberal mobility reforms for
S&T personnel can thus expect to encounter resistance from the
authorities of some work units.
In order to attract scientists and technicians into the
interior and countryside, the State Council and pertinent
jurisdictions under the central government have adopted special
policies regarding terms of service, wages, and retirement in
order to strengthen the S&T contingent in less developed areas,
such as Gansu and Tibet, and to reverse the trend of their
outflow from these areas (WHITE PAPER 1986: 116). The governor
of Yunnan Province has sent teams into other parts of China to
recruit S&T personnel to work in his province, where their pay
scale, position, seniority, grain ration, and household
registration will be recognized (ORLEANS 1986: 15). The
household registration system is the means by which the Chinese
government controls internal migration. Generally, a Chinese
person can obtain work, housing, and food rations in an urban
area only if he or she is legally registered to live there
(WALDER 1984: 19). The Yunnan governor's policy thus reassures
S&T personnel from the relatively developed large coastal
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cities that they will be able to move back home at some point
in the future.
Another set of mobility policies refer to the exchange of
scientific and technological talent through exchange centers.
These centers assist both the transfer of people to jobs that
make better use of their expertise, and the transfer of S&T
personnel between units that lack such talent and those that
have a surplus (ORLEANS 1986: 16). An employee can apply with
a center in order to find a new job, and an employer can apply
to find a new employee. In 1984 there were 746 of these S&T
personnel exchange centers in China (WHITE PAPER 1986: 116).
This number had increased to around 2,000 by late 1987 (CHINA
DAILY 1987a). For the period 1984 to 1985, the number of
transfers completed by these exchange centers rose from 16,000
to 220,000, though this was only a small proportion of total
applicants (WHITE PAPER 1986: 116). According to statistics,
the "flow of scientific and technological personnel" in China
constituted two percent of the total number of such personnel
in 1983 and three percent in 1984 (WHITE PAPER 1986: 116).
This statistic increased to four percent in 1985 (CHINA DAILY
1987a). I am unable, however, to determine whether these
statistics refer only to permanent transfers or include
temporary contract workers as well.
The last two types of mobility reform, those regarding
research contract and spare-time work, are based more upon
monetary incentives. Research contracts are an extension of
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the "paid contract system" that has appeared in many forms in
different parts of the Chinese economy since the late 1970s and
became official policy in the early 1980s (ORLEANS 1986: 22).
The goal of research contracts, from the point of view of the
state, is to loosen the financial dependence of research
institutes upon the state by forcing them to earn income to
cover their operating expenses. In 1983, 3,563 research
institutes directly under the control of the central government
were cited by Orleans to have paid for 36.6 percent of their
operating expenses with income earned from research contracts
(ORLEANS 1986: 23). Contract work is further encouraged by its
exemption from taxes (ORLEANS 1986: 23-24).
Contract research not only facilitates the integration of
research with production, but also more fully utilizes
scientists and technicians by sharing their talent among
different work units that need it (ORLEANS 1986: 22).
Nonetheless, contract research has at least two problems.
First, as pointed out by Orleans, income earned through outside
contracts is generally distributed among research institute
personnel at the discretion of the cadres; this subjective
manner of distribution is likely to create a new set of
problems (ORLEANS 1986: 24). Second, the practice of contract
research, despite its rapid growth, still remains limited to
research institutes that concentrate on applied, rather than
pure, research (Interviewees no. 3 and 4).
The other type of mobility reform based upon monetary
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incentives is spare-time work. A policy statement by the
Central Committee in 1985 states:
On the premise of fulfilling their duties at their
own posts and not infringing on the technological
rights and economic interests of their own units,
scientists and technicians may, in their spare time,
perform technical work and render consultative service.
In the case of utilizing the technological achievements,
material and equipment of their own units, they should
obtain the consent of such units and turn over part of
their compensation. (WHITE PAPER 1986: 117)
In practice, S&T personnel earning extra income from spare-time
work have encountered obstacles by work unit cadres who rightly
or wrongly charge them with ignoring their assigned duties to
pursue outside profits. Orleans in his recent review of spare-
time work policies offers this conclusion:
... what the authorities throughout China are striving
for is a more systematic and a more formal approach
to spare-time work by scientists and engineers. They
prefer agreements between units, rather than between
the scientist and secondary employer, and they prefer
written contracts with carefully spelled out respon-
sibilities of both parties, rather than ad hoc
arrangements. (ORLEANS 1986: 28)
It is noteworthy that in the case of spare-time work, just as
in that of job assignments for graduates in 1985, the
authorities are concerned with preventing employee and employer
from making arrangements directly between themselves. Whether
initial assignment or later mobility, authorities seem
concerned with maintaining an opening in the relationship
between employee and employer. Although I am uncertain of
their reason for doing so, it may be that it helps ensure a
greater degree of state influence over the employee-employer
relationship. This situation needs to be better understood.
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One additional current reform is the "professional
appointment system" mentioned in the 1986 "White Paper" (WHITE
PAPER 1986: 118). This system, which requires jobs to have
specified duties, tenure, and wages, was experimentally
introduced in 51 work units in scientific research and
engineering, as well as agriculture, public health, higher
education, and journalism, in July 1985. Chinese press reports
in early 1987 claimed that the system is widely supported by
intellectuals, and that it has allowed a large number of
outstanding young and middle-aged persons to be promoted over
commonly used seniority criteria. These reports admit that
there will be unavoidable problems in implementing the new
system in local areas, but professes unbounded optimism that
such problems "can always be resolved" by the policies of the
central committee and S&T personnel. (KEJI RIBAO 1987b, 1987c)
These press reports indicate that the professional appointment
system is being applied to persons who are already assigned to
work units, rather than to current graduates. One interviewee
(no. 8), who was assigned to a work unit upon completion of his
Ph.D. in 1986, received his letter of professional appointment
in early 1988. The appointment states that he will be employed
by his work unit for a three-year term upon his return to
China. He is convinced, however, that his work unit will not
let him seek work elsewhere when his term expires because he
will be too valuable an employee to let go.
In regard to the overall reforms in allocation and
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mobility, they may be too recent, and perhaps too limited, to
know what impact they have had on improving job assignments.
Press articles and policy proposals continue to stress the need
for further reform, as I have pointed out above. Orleans cites
a July 1986 statement by the State Council which points out
that, despite some progress, "overstocking, wasting and
misusing scientists and technicians has not been fundamentally
eliminated" (quoted in ORLEANS 1986: 21). If additional
reforms are to be more effective, the causes of mismatches must
be better understood.
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3. EXPLAINING THE MISMATCHES
Although most of China's science and technology graduates
may be well matched to their jobs, many probably are mismatched
due to certain weaknesses of bureaucratic methods for achieving
rational choices in politico-economic organization (LINDBLOM
1977: 65-75). Information, coordination, communication, and
internal control requirements are too vast to be achieved for a
centralized process on a scale as large as all of China.
Incentive mechanisms for allowing work units to release
underutilized talent and for encouraging S&T talent to flow
into priority areas are also poor.
First, the planning system performs the procrustean task
of fitting a given body of graduates, who have been "in the
pipeline" for several years already, as Orleans pointed out
above, to a set number of jobs, the composition of which may
change from year to year according to shifting state
priorities. Mismatching that results from changes in government
priorities and other factors was noted by a Chinese engineer:
"Many scientists and technicians who are originally well suited
to their jobs become underutilized due to policy changes, new
innovations, or bottlenecks in production processes"
(Interviewee no. 4). If present bureaucratic methods are
insufficient to ensure a suitable initial match for all
graduates, such methods are certainly insufficient to keep
graduates suitably matched over the long term as their work
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units encounter exogenous shocks and parameter changes.
Second, nearly all graduates are matched to jobs
indirectly by either the state or their school, so that most
graduates and employers never meet directly until after a
graduate has been assigned to a work unit.
Third, the state and the schools in many cases assign a
student to a position without knowing its job description.
This situation may change if the professional appointment
system, which requires a specification of job duties, is widely
implemented for the initial assignment of S&T graduates.
Evidence so far indicates that it is not.
Fourth, there are few ways for a graduate to change or
reject his or her assignment before beginning it. Afterward,
there are relatively few means for transferring to a job that
would more fully utilize a person's talents. Moreover,
attempts at finding better job opportunities can be blocked by
work place authorities.
Fifth, there is a conflict between the plans of the state
and the preferences of students over where they should be
assigned. Even if a graduate is suitably matched to a job, the
undesirability of its location and amenities may seriously
damage his or her morale and performance.
3.1 APPROACH TO EXPLANATION
One way to explain the mismatches in China's job
assignments for S&T personnel would be to focus upon the
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planned technical aspects of decision making. Mismatches can
be correctly attributed in large part to the bureaucratic
problems given above. By developing specialized skills and
instruments, progress can undoubtedly be made toward reaching
better solutions through bureaucratic methods. "New and
rapidly emerging mathematical and computational aids to
rational decision making have vastly expanded the capacities of
hierarchy-bureaucracy to solve problems" (LINDBLOM 1977: 66).
I have chosen instead to explain the mismatches by
focusing on the study of individual and group objectives and
conflicts. I do so because I believe that application of
technical and bureaucratic decision making processes are
constrained by human conflict and will remain thus unless it is
true that there is only one best way to solve any given problem
(CROZIER 1964: 156-60; LINDBLOM 1977: 247-60). Technical and
bureaucratic decision making alone will provide the optimum
solution only if we accept Lindblom's assumptions that, for
such a model, an underlying harmony of people's needs can be
known to a guiding elite and that intellectual capacity can
conquer the complexity of the social world. I find more
realistic Lindblom's alternative model that assumes harmony of
needs for all individuals is not only undiscoverable, but
nonexistent, and that intellectual capacity is no match for the
complexity of society.
I do not mean to overlook the importance of rational
methods of problem solving, as Crozier and Lindblom refer to
33
processes abstracted from individual preferences. Rather, I
mean to shift the focus of problem solving in another
direction. As Crozier notes, "...the illusion of perfect
rationality has too long persisted, weakening the possibilities
of action by insisting on rigorous logic and immediate
coherence" (CROZIER 1964: 159). It is my intention to
highlight problems of the job assignment system that cannot be
solved by rational technical means, but recognition of which
will undoubtedly enhance such means regardless of whether they
are employed by a centralized or decentralized decision making
process. In this regard, Crozier states two important points.
First, rational processes cannot suppress power and discretion
in human relationships (CROZIER 1964: 157). And second,
rational processes for achieving goals must be devised with
consideration toward the human means of implementation (CROZIER
1964: 149).
Adopting the above approach, I examine first the
objectives of the groups and individuals involved in the job
assignment process and, second, the conflicts among their
objectives that can help explain resulting mismatches.
3.2 OBJECTIVES OF PARTICIPANTS
For everyone who participates in assigning scientists and
technicians to jobs, the process is not an end in itself so
much as it is a means toward a larger objective. The state
desires that its orchestrated allocation of scientists and
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technicians serve its larger objective of modernizing the
national economy. Two of the state's major goals in this
development effort are to achieve balanced regional development
and to integrate research with production (WHITE PAPER 1986:
10). Full utilization of scientific and technological
personnel is an explicit part of the overall development
effort.
Work place authorities hope the allocation of scientists
and technicians will allow their work unit to meet its
production requirements, increase its earning ability, and
enhance its prestige. The allocation system helps ensure a
flow, albeit uncertain and uneven for many work units, of
relatively low-cost scientific and technological talent. At
the same time, as noted above, not all work units that need
scientific and technical assistance are apparently eligible to
request it. It is in the interest of work units that they
become eligible to request S&T talent from the allocation
system or that the state decentralize hiring decisions to the
level of the work unit.
Universities and other higher institutions that graduate
scientists and technicians often hope to increase their role in
job assignments because this process allows schools to
establish lucrative connections with work units (BEIJING REVIEW
1984). This is a welcome opportunity for many universities
that suffer from poor research facilities and inadequate funds
to improve them (ORLEANS 1986: 7; GUANGMING RIBAO 1986c;
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Interviewee no. 4). It should not be surprising to find that
in some cases informal as well as formal exchanges take place
between schools and work units: "Some schools may demand money
from the work unit before assigning [an S&T graduate] there"
(Interviewee no. 4). Some schools believe that their role in
assigning jobs motivates academic competition among students
(GUANGMING RIBAO 1986c), but the discretion of university staff
in making assignments often influences the behavior of students
in other ways, as I will point out later. Further
decentralization of decision making in the allocation process
probably would not be opposed by the schools if they are able
to maintain their intermediary role between students and
employers. As long as there is a job assignment system there
will be such intermediaries. It remains to be seen how the
potentially profitable intermediary role of schools develops in
the future.
Finally, scientists and technicians want the allocation to
result in an assignment that provides them with both
opportunities and amenities. In a society of strong
competition for a limited number of status positions (ORLEANS
1986:36), the allocation system generally guarantees S&T
personnel a coveted state sector job (if they are graduates of
an institution under the State Education Commission) regardless
of how highly motivated they are. At the same time, as
virtually all interviewees lamented, the system deprives them
of greater control over their career.
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Each of these groups encounters conflicts in what they
hope to achieve from the process of job assignments. Some
conflicts arise when a single group or individual
simultaneously holds internally inconsistent goals. Other
conflicts result from a clash of objectives between different
groups or individuals belonging to different groups. Not
surprisingly, the objectives of different groups, or certain
members of different groups, are sometimes aligned. In order
to evaluate the policy on S&T job assignments, it is necessary
to examine its outcomes in terms of the particular patterns of
conflict and alignment that it creates.
3.3 CONFLICTS WITHIN AND AMONG PARTICIPANTS
In this section, I describe the conflicts among the
individuals and groups that participate in job assignments.
These conflicts reveal a pattern of authority and exchange
mechanisms that respond to different incentives and account for
some of the unintended outcomes of the job assignment system.
3.3.1 State. The central government sometimes pursues two
inconsistent policies so that each hinders successful
implementation of the other. One example is the simultaneous
pursuit of policies to achieve balanced regional development
and to create horizontal linkages between research and
production (WHITE PAPER 1986: 10). Given that most scientists
and technicians are very reluctant to work in the less
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developed regions of China, pursuit of balanced regional
development requires an authoritative assignment of S&T
personnel to these regions. Pursuit of horizontal linkages
between research and production units, on the other hand,
requires entrepreneurship and flexibility that presumably must
extend to hiring practices. If the state surrenders its
authority over job assignments, however, many work units in the
interior and countryside would be unable to attract S&T talent
and balanced regional development would be very difficult to
achieve.
In some cases, such as Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces,
both balanced regional development and horizontal linkages are
being achieved (GUANGMING RIBAO 1986b). This success is due to
the locational advantages of these provinces; they contain or
surround large urban areas, such as Shanghai, that have high
concentrations of S&T personnel who perform contract work for
small local enterprises. It seems reasonable to assume that
horizontal linkages and balanced regional development are most
easily achieved in regions near large cities, where S&T
personnel are least resistant to being assigned. Contrary to
this, the further from a large city and the deeper into the
countryside or interior, the more difficult it is to develop
horizontal linkages based on economic agglomeration and the
more necessary it is to use authoritative means to allocate S&T
talent to those regions.
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3.3.2 State and Individual. One particular form of mismatch
already mentioned is that in which the location of an otherwise
suitable job fails to suit the preference of the scientist or
technician assigned to it. In such a case, there is a conflict
between the needs of the state and the desires of the
individual.
There are any number of reasons why someone might prefer
one location to another. One engineer preferred her hometown
of Shanghai to Peking because she thought that she would come
into hopeless competition with the children of V.I.P.s in the
latter city (Interviewee no. 4). Another engineer, who
initially was glad to get a prestigious assignment in Peking,
later was relieved to leave that city when the political
climate became tense (Interviewee no. 7). These examples
inaccurately imply that Peking is not a desirable location; in
fact, it is one of the most coveted places in which to receive
an assignment. The most unwelcome assignments are generally
those in the interior and countryside. Scientists and
technicians resist these assignments because undeveloped
regions usually cannot provide the amenities that these highly
skilled persons demand. Both the interviewees with whom I
spoke and the Chinese documents that I reviewed consistently
agreed that the amenities that most concern S&T personnel are
their living standards (including household registration
status, wages and housing), their children's education, their
own intellectual development, their career opportunities, their
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political environment, and their autonomy over their own
research (GUANGMING RIBAO 1987, 1986a, 1986d; RENMIN RIBAO
OVERSEAS EDITION 1986; BEIJING KEJI BAO 1986; YANG 1986; WHITE
PAPER 1986: 113-18).
None of these amenities is easy to provide, even in large
cities. There are some attempts, however, to provide at least
a few amenities in order to attract S&T personnel into less
developed regions, as Orleans' example of the Yunnan provincial
governor showed. Maintaining a person's standard of living by
recognizing his or her original household registration and
providing attractive wages and housing can be done on a
piecemeal basis with perhaps relatively little difficulty, but
providing the other amenities generally requires a complex set
of social and physical infrastructure that takes a long time
and a lot of money to build.
The educational opportunities that scientists and
technicians tend to demand for their children require
substantial long-term investments in plant and organization.
In the meanwhile, this problem might be solved by enabling
their children to attend schools outside of the region or for
them to be given preferential treatment on the competitive
entrance exams for middle school, high school and university.
This concern over education is illustrated by one interviewee
(no. 7) who gladly accepted a job at a university in Peking
partly because his three year old son would be able to attend
the excellent university-run kindergarten and thus gain a head
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start in the ultimate competition for degrees.
Some of the other amenities also require long-term
investments for which there are few satisfactory temporary
substitutes. As regards intellectual development, one
interviewee (no. 2) described the difficulty that Chinese S&T
personnel face in keeping up-to-date in their field, even at
the best job assignments. At her prestigious research
institute in Shanghai, the library regularly collects about 200
professional journals, mostly from the United States (only five
to ten percent of the journals were Chinese). These journals
are, however, usually six months old by the time they become
available. Virtually all interviewees attached great
importance to professional journals from abroad as a means of
keeping up in their field. Work units in the interior and
countryside certainly would not have regular access to such a
library and its journals.
Work units in the interior and countryside may not be able
to provide S&T personnel with many career opportunities either.
In this regard, several interviewees described the importance
of developing contacts with experts in their field. Three of
the eight persons with whom I spoke attributed their current
research opportunity in the United States to visiting American
scientists whom they were able to meet in China (nos. 2, 3, and
8). Such opportunity would not have been possible at a less
prestigious work unit in the interior or countryside, where
influential experts, Chinese, American, or any other, rarely
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work or visit.
Two other amenities frequently mentioned in conversation
are political tolerance and autonomy over one's own work. One
interviewee (no. 8) described a distinct difference in the
political climate between the "liberal" coastal cities and the
"conservative" interior of China. Despite his desire to avoid
a restrictive environment, he admitted that in the less
competitive interior he might become "a big fish in a small
pond" (or, in Chinese, "when there is no tiger in the
mountains, the monkey is king"). In such a case, he would more
likely be able to choose his own projects rather than have them
dictated to him. This situation depends, however, on the
particular character of the cadres in a given work unit--
officious and meddlesome personalities cross all political
boundaries. Even if he were able to direct his own research,
he would be, as other interviewees pointed out, limited by the
generally inferior facilities and lack of materials in the
interior or countryside.
Other amenities important to many Chinese are family,
food, and language. There are often strong differences in food
and dialects across regions of China and returning home for
family visits can be difficult. One interviewee (no. 8)
described a cousin from Shanghai who, upon learning of his
assignment to a job in Hunan, a relatively developed interior
province, cried out, perhaps somewhat exaggeratedly, "I'll die
if I go to Hunan!" He cited these three amenities, along with
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the other conditions mentioned here, as his cousin's biggest
objections in being sent to Hunan.
I asked this interviewee if a Chinese would react the same
way if he or she were sent to the United States for advanced
studies and became cut off from familiar food, language, and
relatives. "Being cut off from these things in America is
tolerable," he said, because in the United States, even more so
than in Shanghai, a Chinese enjoys a relatively higher standard
of living, better educational opportunities for their children,
more opportunities for intellectual development and career
advancement, greater political tolerance, and increased
autonomy over their own work.
Individual scientists and technicians sometimes can defy
the authority of the state over job assignments. A visitor
returning to the Yunnan border region for the first time since
1978 reports that many of the scientists and technicians
assigned there have since moved away and that those who have
not left are looking for opportunities to do so (YANG 1986).
Similar outflows of talent are reported in Guizhou, Gansu,
Inner Mongolia, and Tibet (WHITE PAPER: 116). In 1985, only 58
of 103 graduates assigned to a mountainous area of Sichuan
arrived to take their posts as teachers (ORLEANS 1986: 9).
"The state cannot force scientists and engineers to go where
they do not want go," claimed one interviewee (no. 8).
According to him and other interviewees, the state is better
able to ensure that S&T personnel assume their assigned posts
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when they have no other opportunities for seeking work.
China's economic reforms loosen this assurance by providing
some work units the opportunity to get rich and then use higher
wages to lure S&T personnel away from their assigned jobs.
The conflict between the needs of the state and the
desires of individuals over assignments in the interior and
countryside reveal a chicken-and-egg type of problem. In order
to attract S&T personnel into these regions to assist in their
development, these regions must provide amenities that
generally can be supported only by the social and physical
infrastructure of a more advanced region. Even if the state's
policy for balanced regional development argues against
maximizing agglomeration economies, scientists and technicians
nonetheless demand an agglomeration of non-economic amenities
that can generally only be provided by a more centralized
development pattern.
3.3.3 State and Work Units. The authority over the mobility of
personnel that is granted to work unit cadres by the state
often clashes with the state's own desires to deploy S&T
personnel in the most effective manner. As regards the S&T
personnel system, the "White Paper" sets forth the state's
explicit intention of the state to overcome the "situation of
excessive restrictions on personnel" and the "absence of
rational flow of talented people" in order to "create a
favorable environment for the emergence of competent people and
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the full use of their abilities" (WHITE PAPER 1986: 14). The
state attributes the blame for these problems to the management
system, which binds the freedom of movement for scientists and
technicians and restricts the development of the knowledge and
abilities of S&T personnel: "Some leaders are anxious about the
movement of scientists and technicians, that this will weaken
the technical capacity of their own units; some fear that
scientific and technical personnel will go 'in droves'...and
some would even rather confine scientists and technicians who
have insufficient tasks or who have no tasks at all..." (JILIN
S&T COMMISSION 1987).
Work units to which scientists and technicians have been
assigned by the state may keep those persons in unsuitable
positions and thus undermine the state's intention to fully
utilize S&T personnel. Contrary to this, other work units in
the countryside and interior may release S&T personnel, as
suggested by the reported outflows of S&T talent from certain
regions noted above. This subverts the state's plans for
balanced regional development.
Work units not eligible to request S&T personnel from the
allocation system must depend on attracting them away from
their assigned jobs with offers of higher wages. This too, in
some cases, undermines the state's development plans. These
conflicts between state policy and work unit management
practices leads directly to the conflicts between work units
and S&T personnel.
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3.3.4 Work Units and Individuals. Once assigned to a job,
scientists and technicians become heavily dependent upon the
work unit cadres, who hold a high degree of discretion over
their mobility, both within the work unit and from one work
unit to another. The interests of the individual and work unit
clash when a cadre uses his or her authority to block the
requested transfer of a scientist or technician, regardless of
whether this action upholds or subverts state policy. In the
latter cases, the work unit counteracts with the state, as
described above. Contrary to this, the interests of the state
and individual are generally aligned when the state seeks to
loosen excessive restriction on mobility.*
As regards intra-firm mobility, several interviewees spoke
about the reluctance of S&T personnel to request transfer to a
more suitable position within the same work unit. One engineer
(Interviewee no. 4) felt her talents were better suited to
another research department within her work unit but she never
attempted to transfer because she felt certain that her request
would be denied. Another interviewee (no. 3) was assigned to
do manual work in a factory for two years after receiving a
M.D. degree. He, too, felt certain that any request for
transfer to a more suitable department within the same work
* Note, however, that the state's objective to increase
mobility should in some cases be distinguished from its
objective to fully utilize S&T talent. The latter is a goal
which less highly motivated S&T personnel may obstruct if it
meant working harder or being assigned to an undesirable location.
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unit would be rejected. Although both of these cases occurred
before the current reform program began in 1978, similar
instances still occur. For example, Orleans cites a report of
applied physics graduates working in warehouses in the 1980s
(ORLEANS 1986: 2). In addition, many S&T personnel are still
hesitant to seek suitable transfers within the work unit for
fear of upsetting cadres and coworkers, reports one interviewee
(no. 2). Her report is confirmed by a recent press article:
"The majority of S&T personnel dare not bring up their own
concerns and needs to leaders in fear that they will be treated
unjustly" (JILIN S&T COMMISSION 1987).
Work unit cadres, at least in some cases, can block an
employee who seeks mobility by means of attending graduate
school (Interviewees no. 3, 6 and 8). Earning a graduate
degree in China is desirable not only as a way to tackle more
challenging work and earn promotions; it is also a good way to
transfer out of your work unit. Upon completion of graduate
studies, a student reenters the allocation process and is
reassigned to a different work unit. Due to the extreme
scarcity of advanced degrees, reports one interviewee (no. 7),
a graduate student generally has more choice over his or her
assignment. Scientists and technicians fear that cadres might
not permit them to apply to graduate school because they do not
want to lose highly skilled personnel who, even if
underutilized within the work unit, would be extremely
difficult to replace.
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As regards inter-firm mobility, the incentive to hoard
highly skilled personnel often leads work unit cadres to block
the transfer of S&T personnel to other work units. In many
cases, the cadre can succeed in blocking a transfer because
legal transfer between two state-sector work units requires
agreement from both sides in question. Theoretically, cadres
cannot block the transfer of personnel to work units outside
the state sector. One interviewee (no. 8) related the story of
a friend who, against the strong objection of his work unit,
quit his teaching job in order to accept a job with a Japanese
firm in Shanghai at a 300 percent increase in salary. There
are, however, stories of other foreign firms unable to hire
Chinese personnel because of the interference of work unit
cadres. Xerox Shanghai Copier Ltd., a new joint venture of the
U.S. multinational, has encountered considerable difficulty in
its attempts to hire 200 technicians and managers because many
promising candidates are not allowed to leave their existing
jobs at state-run organizations (THE WALL STREET JOURNAL 1988).
Sometimes a work unit agrees to the transfer of a
scientist or technician, whose mobility is in a direction
opposite to the state's interest. Orleans notes that most
voluntary movement of S&T personnel takes place in the
direction opposite from the one intended by the state. He
cites a Sichuan Province party statement to this effect: "It is
necessary to prevent people from moving to better places, big
cities, and higher organs..." (ORLEANS 1986: 15). When an
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individual seeks and receives permission to move in a direction
opposite of that intended by the state, it is usually the
result of that individual's guanxi with a work unit cadre or
another superior. Guanxi, as Walder describes them, are
personal ties that are distinct from a purely institutional
relationship. These ties play an especially important role in
situations where there exists an unusually high degree of
dependence of subordinates upon superiors, such as there is
between S&T personnel and work unit cadres. These ties or
relationships may be cultivated to be stable and long term or
quickly made for a one-time-only favor. (WALDER 1983: 69) Many
S&T personnel attempt to use guanxi to effect their transfer
out of undesirable work units. Although I do not have
documented statistics on such incidents, one interviewee (no.
8) estimated that 80 percent of the scientists and engineers
who are assigned to the countryside and interior from large
coastal cities eventually return. Virtually all of his
personal acquaintances from Shanghai who had been assigned to
distant regions have since come back. "Everyone can do it
(return)," he said. "It all depends on how good your guanxi
are. Some people can do it within a year or two. Others take
longer. It shouldn't take more than ten years."
3.3.5 Work Units. Conflicts between work units that result in
mismatches include those between work units that are eligible
to request allocation of S&T graduates from the state and those
49
that are not eligible, and between those work units that are
able to perform contract work and those that are not able.
Research institutes under the central government, particularly
those under the Chinese Academy of Sciences, not only offer the
most prestigious graduate training and employment, but they are
able to keep many of their graduates for themselves. Less
prestigious research institutes that would like to employee
these graduates but are unable to do so complain about this
"inbreeding" (SIMON 1987: 143-44). Although one interviewee
(no. 7) claims that the Ministry of Labor and Personnel limits
the amount of inbreeding, another one (no. 8) argued that the
debate over inbreeding is entirely internal to the research
community; the government, he claims, has more important
concerns.
Other conflicts occur when work units become wealthy,
often through contract work, and are thus able to attract S&T
personnel away from their assigned jobs. My interviews and
review of documents and literature indicate that this is often
a conflict between state-run work units and those not under the
direct control of the state. Many of the latter are able to
take advantage of contract work because their system of
accounts is relatively flexible; state-run enterprises tend to
have much stricter accounts that prevent them from performing
contract work (KEYAN GUANLI 1987; Interviewee no.4). Orleans
concurs that "non-governmental" work units tend to be more
flexible (ORLEANS 1986: 32). Contract work is also generally
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limited to work units engaged in applied technology rather than
pure scientific research; one interviewee (no. 7) defined
contract work as "applications for production in order to earn
money;" in other words, as market-oriented. Thus work units
that have flexible accounts and perform marketable applications
of technology in many cases tend also to be outside the state
sector. This allows them, at least in theory, to hire S&T
personnel away from other work units without the approval of
the latter's authorities (although, as cited above, state-
sector cadres sometimes can prevent their personnel from
transferring, even to jobs outside the state-sector). Many
work units are becoming more competitive about attracting and
retaining S&T personnel. It remains to be seen whether this
situation can ensure a flow of S&T talent into projects,
sectors, and regions targeted by the state.
3.3.6 Work Units and Schools. The relationship between schools
and work units also influences the match of scientists and
technicians to jobs. Universities and other schools are able
to turn their role as intermediary to profitable advantage by
guaranteeing an allocation of their graduates to work units
that are willing to support this service (GUANGMING RIBAO
1986c). In some cases, work units can send selected employees
to a school for specialized training and be certain that they
will return after acquiring specialized skills (ORLEANS 1986:
7). Such a program ensures better matches of graduates to
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jobs. In these cases, too, it remains to be seen whether
further decentralization of job assignments to an arrangement
between schools and work units will ensure a flow of S&T talent
in accordance with state plans.
3.3.7 Schools and State. Scientific and technical education
sometimes exacerbates the shortcomings of the allocation
system. This system, as I have tried to show, often matches an
individual to a job for which he or she has not been suitably
trained. Such mismatches might be less of a failure of the
system if scientists and technicians were more broadly
prepared. Some interviewees explained that many Chinese S&T
personnel receive too narrow an education at school. Their
descriptions of the narrow applicability of some person's
training echo an earlier description by Orleans given nearly 30
years ago:
For example, physics is no longer taught as a
distinct and integrated subject. Instead a student
majoring in electrical engineering will study elect-
ricity; one majoring in mechanical engineering will
study only those aspects of physics which are directly
pertinent to his field, etc. Similarly, analytical
chemistry is combined with technical analysis, and
physical chemistry with electrochemistry. New
theoretical courses have been devised for each
specialty. (ORLEANS 1960: 61)
The civil engineer who, as mentioned above, was assigned to a
chemical engineer's position (Interviewee no. 7) was able to
adjust successfully to his position, although he said many of
his coworkers with civil engineering degrees who were similarly
forced to become chemical engineers could not adjust because
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they lacked general knowledge upon which to draw.
Inconsistencies between the input requirements of the job
assignment system and the output of the education system
contribute toward some S&T personnel becoming overtrained for
their jobs. For example, one engineer (Interviewee no. 7)
complained that "high school graduates with technical skills
would have been sufficient for many of the jobs filled by
university graduates in our chemical engineering plant, but
there aren't enough vocational schools to train people." His
explanation for this situation was that "the companies want
more vocational schools graduates, but they are unwilling to
offer financial support to run vocational schools."
Orleans has a different explanation for the shortage of
vocational school graduates. Although he admits that
vocational schools tend to suffer for funds, he argues that
China's urban youth prefer to enter college preparatory high
schools. When these high school graduates fail the university
entrance exams, as most do because of the extremely low
admittance ratio, they then enter the work force without
practical skills (ORLEANS 1986: 36). Here is an area in which
the state, schools, and work units can cooperate for better
training and utilization of scarce human resources.
3.3.8 Schools and Individuals. The banzhuren, like the work
unit cadre, is an intermediary whose role prevents individuals
and work units from making their own matches between employee
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and employer. Like the work unit cadre, the banzhuren also has
a large measure of discretion over the assignment of his or her
subordinates. The banzhuren does not, however, always use this
discretion to place the most talented students in the most
challenging positions. The most challenging positions are
invariably those in the most prestigious work units with the
best amenities in the largest cities. The students who have
the best guanxi with the banzhuren are often the ones assigned
to these positions (that is, when students are assigned jobs by
the school rather than directly by the state). One interviewee
(no. 5), who graduated number one in his class of 120 students
in an eight-year program, was passed over by the banzhuren in
assigning the best jobs. The banzhuren said that he was "not a
good student." According to his banzhuren, a "good" student is
one who participates in political activities, interacts
sociably with others, and comes form a well-connected family.
The interviewee in question was somewhat bookish, uninvolved in
politics, and came from a rather ordinary family. The
competition for the most challenging jobs is sometimes defined
by subjective criteria hinging upon a personal relationship.
Some of the brightest students, reports another interviewee
(no. 8), who also graduated at the top of his class, refuse to
compete under such circumstances.
3.3.9 Individuals and Peers. Conflict between an individual
and his or her peers does not seem to result in mismatches
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between S&T personnel and jobs so much as it affects their
productivity. As regards conflicts that hinder the
productivity of persons who are otherwise well matched to jobs,
these are a different sort of conflict than those I am
examining. Nonetheless, such conflicts are important insofar
as they decrease the productive potential of China's S&T
personnel. Therefore, I mention briefly a few that occur among
individual S&T personnel.
One scientist who worked at a prestigious research
institute in the mid-1980s reported a "very relaxed atmosphere"
in her work unit, with a lot of chatting, newspaper reading,
and napping (Interviewee no. 2), not unlike another description
of a much less prestigious work unit during the Cultural
Revolution (Interviewee no. 3). She kept a busy schedule and
applied herself diligently, sometimes to the consternation of
coworkers, who told her, "Don't look too good--you'll make the
rest of us look bad."
Productivity may be below potential for reasons other than
peers pressuring each other to maintain a relaxed work
environment. The same scientist mentioned in the last
paragraph (no. 2) compared the openness of discussion about
research in her lab in the United States with that
in her lab in China, where discussion about research was
generally shared only with friends. She attributed this
secrecy to three reasons. First, theory and technique remain
uncertain in an emerging field of technology. Researchers
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attempt, however, to hide their ignorance from each other.
Second, protection of ideas is uncertain. No one is certain
that others will not steal his or her ideas and get the credit
for them. Third, lack of mobility leads to extreme competition
for promotion. This last point is, however, discounted by an
engineer who claimed that there was very little competition
among workers in her unit because there were so few promotions
(Interviewee no. 4).
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4. CONCLUSIONS
In this conclusion, I first specify some caveats about my
study, then summarize my conclusions in a descriptive model of
the job assignment system, and finally point out directions for
further research.
4.1 CAVEATS
As a first caveat, the reader should not take this study
to be more than an initial effort in analyzing the conflict
that underlies and shapes the process of job assignments for
China's scientists and technicians. The small number of
Chinese S&T personnel with whom I had limited contact in the
United States may not have accurately reflected the experiences
and perspectives of the majority of their colleagues in China.
A better understanding of the forces behind the assignment
process could be gained from a more thorough interview
technique applied to a wider variety of persons, including not
only S&T personnel, but university and vocational school staff,
work unit cadres, and government officials.
Second, the reader should be aware that many more reforms
are being tried upon job allocation and mobility in China than
could be reviewed here. Many of these reforms are devised, as
well as implemented, by local agencies in accordance with local
needs. Such reforms certainly far outnumber state-sponsored
reforms, but are in many cases tacitly supported by the state.
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Finally, the reader should know how generalizable my
findings on S&T personnel are to the rest of the Chinese work
force. Unlike highly skilled scientists and technicians,
China's unskilled and semi-skilled labor is abundant. The
problem for them is one of labor absorption. Nonetheless,
unskilled and semi-skilled urban labor is allocated in a
similar manner to that of S&T talent (ECKSTEIN 1978: 142-45).
Furthermore, work units not only are generally unable to hire
ordinary workers directly, they also tend to hoard such
workers. Ordinary workers also face similar difficulties in
transferring between work units. Because there is no scarcity
of ordinary workers, they may have even fewer opportunities for
career advancement.
4.2 A DESCRIPTIVE MODEL
One certain conclusion to be drawn from this study is that
China's job assignment system is a complex hybrid of authority
and exchange mechanisms that grow and shrink as participants
engage in conflicts over various objectives. Conflicts within
and among the state, schools, work units, and scientists and
technicians are generally the result of attempts by some
individuals or groups to exercise or expand their ability to
achieve objectives through exchange clashing with the attempts
of others to invoke authority in order to limit those exchanges
or channel them in another direction. Below, I attempt to
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abstract from many of the details of the previous discussion in
order to summarize my conclusions in a descriptive model of the
system (see Figure 4-1).
The allocation of S&T graduates by the state is largely an
authoritative process that emphasizes the priorities of the
state, but must eventually account for the preferences of
individuals, work units, and schools. The state exercises its
authority to ensure a flow of required S&T talent into targeted
projects, sectors, and regions. Realization of these
priorities may, however, become less certain when exchange
relationships are injected into this authoritative system. For
example, if the state delegates authority over assignments to
the schools, then schools and work units may establish formal
or informal arrangements, whereby, in exchange for financial
support, a school guarantees an allotment of its graduates to a
work unit. Such an exchange relationship may counteract the
intentions of the state.
When the state attempts to account for the preferences of
individuals and work units, it generally does so by indirect
means. For example, if the state does not assume that its own
agencies are capable of satisfying the needs and desires of
individuals and work units, it may decentralize the matchmaking
process by delegating to the schools or some other intermediary
the authority to assign jobs. Rarely does the state permit
work units and individuals to satisfy their preferences by
making direct arrangements between themselves.
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Figure 4-1: Pattern of Authority and Exchange in
the Job Assignment System for Scientists and Technicians in
the People's Republic of China
Realization of these
priorities is loosened by
exchange mechanisms
emphasize
state priorities
These preferences are
satisfied indirectly by
the state or another
intermediary
-> but must account for
individual, work unit,
and school preferences
Mobility -> emphasize individual and -> but must account for
processes work unit preferences state priorities
(Exchange-
oriented) A A
Realization of these
preferences is constrained by
authority measures
These state priorities
are satisfied
indirectly by
work units
and individuals
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Contrary to the authority-oriented allocation process, the
mobility of S&T personnel after their initial job assignment is
generally achieved by means of exchange. These means emphasize
the preferences of work units and individuals, but must not
stray too far from state priorities. The tacit or open support
of the state for exchange of S&T personnel between work units
indicates acknowledgment by the state that its authoritative
allocation sometimes fails to produce good matches. The range
of mobility that the state tolerates to correct faulty matches
is, however, limited.
Realization of individuals and work units' preferences
through the exchange of personnel is constrained by
authoritative measures maintained by the state, such as the
household registration system and state dominance over urban
housing and labor markets. The near total absence of private
housing in Chinese cities helps to prevent an unwanted movement
of people. The monopoly that state employment bureaus hold
over assignment to state-run work units also constrains the
mobility of S&T personnel. The ability of the state to direct
the exchange of S&T personnel is intended to be strengthened by
the authority over personnel mobility that is invested in work
unit cadres. This optimistically assumes, of course, that the
cadres always use their authority in conformance with the
state's interests.
In both the authority-oriented allocation processes and
the exchange-oriented mobility processes, the state, by
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prescribing the contact between employers and potential
employees, can attempt to tighten or loosen authority as it
sees fit. This helps the state to elicit the response that it
desires from individuals and work units, and thus move their
activity in a certain direction.
In both authority-oriented and exchange-oriented
processes, there remain informal means of authority and
exchange. These can counteract or support the state's
intentions. As long as individuals are able to cultivate the
type of personal relationships known as guanxi, they will
continue to seek means of gaining special advantage when they
face obstacles. The cost of relying on such relationships,
however, also tends to rise and fall with the degree of
tightness or looseness that the state places on exchange
mechanisms.
If this description is accurate, then any improvement in
the job assignment system must account for the dual processes
of authority and exchange and their formal and informal methods
of operation. Jobs in the S&T sector are determined by both of
these authority and exchange processes, but each process
provides different incentives to participants. These
inconsistency incentives produce some of the unintended results
in job assignments that were discussed above.
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This study illustrates the conflicts over job assignments
by examining the actions of the participating groups and
individuals. In order to do so, I employed typological
categories for the participants and then studied the conflicts
among types of actors. A more penetrating study may result
from further examining the conflicts I have laid out among
typologoical categories and sorting these conflicts into
analytical categories. Such a method may reveal more about the
forces shaping job assignments than I have been able to do
here.
For example, my approach uncovered the conflict between
the schools and the state insofar as students are often
narrowly trained yet face a relatively high probability of
being mismatched because of the lack of job descriptions used
in making assignments. The alternative approach would
highlight the reasons for narrow training and lack of job
descriptions. Another example is that, whereas my approach
reveals the conflict resulting when an individual uses guanxi
to secure the work unit's approval for transfer to a more
desirable location, the alternative method might stress the
forces that give rise to the development of guanxi and the
reasons why a work unit cadre would approve such a transfer
when it is contrary to the flow of S&T talent intended by the
state.
Even if I were to continue using typological categories, I
would want to refine them. For example, although I have
63
analyzed the cadres, banzhuren, and scientists and technicians
as individuals, I have tended to examine the state, schools,
and work units as single units. It is necessary to know more
about the individual actors within these groups. Taking the
individual as the unit of analysis may not, however, always be
the most appropriate method. I have tried to analyze
scientists and technicians as individuals when, in fact, as the
discussion of their amenities made clear, some of their
objectives are concerned with securing goods and services for
family members rather than for themselves. In sum, my
typological categories are incomplete and even complete
categories may not provide the most profound method of
analysis.
After an appropriate method is decided upon, the topic of
this study may be expanded by asking whether the agencies
entrusted with organizing the system of job assignments seek to
maximize efficiency of S&T output or to reduce tensions that
develop among groups and individuals in the S&T sector.
Another direction for future research is to examine the
dynamics of the allocation model. Is it moving away from
large-scale bureaucratic organization toward decentralized
decision making over job assignments, or can the reforms be
seen as extensions of the centralized model that strengthen the
ability of the center to create better matches? Finally, what
does the system of job assignments imply for the future
development of China? This study has highlighted the conflict
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between the intentions of the state to enlist S&T personnel in
the development of the countryside and interior, and the
preferences of scientists and technicians for amenities that
can usually be found only in China's larger and more developed
cities. In a country as large, diverse, and populated as
China, should development be attempted at a relatively even
rate everywhere, or should regions with advantages for
development be allowed to proceed unfettered?
This last question has been argued countless times in the
PRC. I raise it again because of its importance to the
deployment of S&T personnel. Balanced regional development and
integration of research and production seem to succeed best in
regions of proximity to the larger and more developed cities.
In order to make the most of S&T talent while simultaneously
meeting their needs, should the Chinese allow agglomeration
economies to develop more freely? Would such a development
pattern achieve a more rapid rate of economic growth?
As long as China maintains a planned economy and sets
priorities for the development of certain projects, sectors,
and regions, despite a scarcity of scientific and technological
personnel with which to carry out such development, the
allocation of S&T personnel under the direction of the state is
likely to continue. Since this scenario is unlikely to change
in the foreseeable future, it is worthwhile to further study
the process of job assignments to understand how they might be
improved.
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APPENDIX: NOTES ON INTERVIEWS
This appendix on the interviews that I conducted as a part
of my study is included in order to allow the reader a better
understanding of my findings. This appendix provides some
details on types of persons with whom I spoke, means by which I
contacted them, patterns in their interview behavior (including
those of persons who declined to be interviewed), and sample
biases and other considerations.'
TYPES OF INTERVIEWEES
I began this project with greater focus on job mobility,
rather than the job allocation system, for Chinese science and
technology (S&T) graduates. I began looking for interviewees
with an ideal type in mind. He or she would have been in the
United States (U.S.) for one year or less, would have training
and work experience as a scientist or technician in the
People's Republic of China (PRC), and would have the traits of
being reflective, expressive, and candid. Such an ideal was
hard to locate. One difficulty was that the most "open"
persons also tended to be the youngest, who were also had the
least work experience. As I came to focus more on assignments
for S&T graduates, this problem became less of an obstacle.
' For an excellent discussion on the use of interviews as
a method, see Andrew G. Walder, "Appendix A: The Hong Kong
Interviews: An Essay on Method," in Communist Neo-
Traditionalism (Berkeley, 1986), pp. 255-69.
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I carried out 11 interviews with eight persons, totaling
26 hours, in March and April 1988. I collected 49 pages of
mostly single-spaced hand written notes. My sample of eight
S&T personnel included six men and two women, three of whom
were 30 years old and under, four between the ages of 31 to 41
years, and one over the age of 41 years.
Five of the interviewees studied natural sciences, three
of them in emerging fields. The other three studied
engineering, one of them in an emerging field. Five of them
were currently pursuing or had already completed a Ph.D. degree
(three of which were Ph.D.s from American universities). Two
persons held only a B.S. degree, and one held only a M.D.
degree.
As for their length of stay in the United States, five of
the interviewees had been in this country for between one and
two years, one had been here for three years, and two persons
for between four and five years. Five of the eight had sought
out their own opportunities for coming to the U.S.; one was
awarded the opportunity through competition; I do not know how
the other two came to this country. One had already become a
permanent resident of the U.S., another had the explicit
intention to stay here, and three of the others implied that
they had similar intentions.
As for the backgrounds of the eight interviewees, four
were from former capitalist and landlord families, three from
intellectual families, and one was the son of a minor party
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cadre who had joined the Chinese Communist Party before 1949.
None were from worker, peasant, or soldier families. Six of
the eight persons have fathers who graduated from Western-style
universities in pre-1949 China.
All eight interviewees were from coastal provinces of
China; five were from the city of Shanghai. All eight also
attended universities in coastal provinces, but not necessarily
in their home province.
All of the interviewees had attended prestigious
universities and graduated at or near the top of their class.
Five attended universities in Shanghai, but only some of these
five were from Shanghai. Six of the eight interviewees had
post-university work experience in China; one had lengthy pre-
university technical employment; and one had come to the U.S.
directly after receiving the B.S. degree. Of the seven with
work experience in China, only three had worked in or around
Shanghai. None had, however, worked as scientists or
technicians in remote parts of the countryside or interior.
MEANS OF CONTACTING INTERVIEWEES
I began locating interviewees by first talking about my
project and describing my ideal interviewee type to a friend
who has contacts among PRC students and visiting scholars in
the United States. He later arranged for me to interview a PRC
scientist. Afterward, persons whom I had already interviewed
then arranged for me to interview their friends and
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acquaintances. In these cases, previous interviewees had passed
on to prospective interviewees the list of questions that I
would ask them. Four interviewees were contacted in this
manner.
In three other cases I was introduced to the interviewee
indirectly by the friend-of-a-friend, rather than directly as
in the first four cases.
Finally, in only one case did I approach a person and
request an interview without having first been formally
introduced. I did so because I was interested in that person's
field of study.
PATTERNS OF INTERVIEW BEHAVIOR
Why would a Chinese student or visiting scholar in the
United States agree to meet an American to talk about his or
her own experiences and attitudes? I do not know for sure why
any of the interviewees agreed to talk with me, but possible
motivations should be considered. They may have agreed to meet
me only because they were interested in the proposed topic (job
mobility of Chinese S&T personnel). Certainly, it was not
money that motivated them. I could not able to pay them for
their time, although I always brought fresh fruit or cakes when
I went to their home or office.
I made it clear to each person before arranging a meeting
that the purpose of the interview was for them to speak about
their work histories in as specific a manner as possible. I
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also made clear the guarantee of anonymity, which they all
greeted with relief. I encouraged them to speak Mandarin
Chinese, thinking they would be able to express themselves
better that way than in English. Few of them chose to do so.
I cannot be sure why. Did they not believe that I could really
understand Chinese? Did they want to impress me with their
ability to speak Chinese? Not all of them spoke English very
well. Did they view the interview as a free English lesson?
The two who chose to speak in Chinese may have done so because
their English was especially poor. Coincidentally, these two
were also the least relaxed.
Many interviewees seemed to be as interested in me as they
were in my topic. At each meeting, before we broached the
intended subject of discussion, they would always ask me (with
a why-in-the-world sort of expression) what interest an
American student had in writing about the job mobility of
Chinese scientists and technicians. For that matter, all of
them seemed curious to know why I wanted to know anything about
China. Admittedly, mine is not a topic that many American
graduate students would choose for their thesis, but is it any
more esoteric than others? Would they have expressed the same
sort of wonder if I had approached them to talk about diesel
exhaust heat wave recovery for naval vessels, or some other
technical matter? Thus, I would begin each meeting with a brief
tale about myself, how I studied Chinese history, learned the
Chinese language, worked in Taiwan for four years, and visited
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the Chinese mainland on numerous occasions. After that, I would
ask them to reciprocate with a story on their own background so
that I might place the views of each person into a context for
evaluation.
Several of the interviewees suspected me of being
extremely unknowledgable about China. They would lecture me on
worn out generalities, saying things like, "China is very
different from the United States. You see, China is a
socialist country..." This suspicion seemed to be greatest
among those who declined to be interviewed.
Almost as many people declined to be interviewed as
accepted. Of the five refusals, two were from Ph.D. students
and three were from visiting scholars. Of the two Ph.D.
students, one considered himself unsuitable because of his
field of study (although I assured him that it was indeed
suitable). The other declined because he felt that he could
not provide up-to-date information on China due to his long
absence (five years).
The three visiting scholars who declined to be interviewed
were all men over 40 years old. One of these men refused
indirectly, telling a friend whom had already been interviewed
that he did not care to do so himself. The friend told me that
this man was afraid of suffering negative political
repercussions from the interview. Moreover, he felt that I was
only interested in negative criticism without having any no
constructive purpose.
71
The two other men directly declined an interview. One of
them, who was introduced by a friend who had been interviewed,
was unlike all others; he was an official involved in the
management of scientists and technicians. Both he and the
other man, curiously, declined the interview offer in a very
similar manner to decline an interview. They did not say
merely, "No, thank you. I'm not interested." Instead, they
lectured me for several minutes in stern tones on the
worthlessness of my attempt to interview anyone on this
subject. They insisted that everything I need to know about
allocation and mobility of S&T personnel has already been
written and can be learned from the Chinese newspapers and
journals (I had already looked at these items, which are tend
to be official views of general conditions and policies). They
said that nothing could be learned from speaking to Chinese S&T
personnel because each individual had a unique experience from
which nothing can be generalized. They claimed not to
understand why I was interested in learning the details of
particular experiences and why I was not satisfied with
information that appears in the press.
SAMPLE BIASES AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
The perspective of my study has been influenced by the
persons with whom I spoke. Therefore, it is not only necessary
to know about the types of persons with whom I spoke, but also
about their degree of representativeness. In this regard,
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there are several problems and biases with my sample.
First, none of the persons with whom I spoke has been in
the PRC during the past year. Given the rapid pace at which
reform is taking place in China, there may be some important
experiments in allocation and mobility of which these people
were unaware because of their absence from home.
Second, my sample suffers from an imbalanced age
distribution. It consists almost entirely of scientists and
engineers under the age of 40, who are a minority of China's
total S&T personnel. Only one of the persons with whom I spoke
in 1988 was over the age of 41, yet 66 percent of S&T personnel
in the PRC were over the age of 39 in 1985 (DONG and CHEN: 8).
Furthermore, in the Chinese case age may play a special role
for historical reasons. It is possible that persons over the
age of 30 may be generally more reticent to speak about their
experiences if they are mindful of the consequences that many
people suffered for seemingly trivial comments in China's
recent past. Even if my study included a larger number of
older persons, it might have still tended to reflect the
perspectives of the younger persons if the older ones had been
less willing to speak openly.
Third, the persons with whom I spoke, like most PRC
scientists and engineers in the U.S., tended to be
exceptionally accomplished. They are undoubtedly better
educated, more intelligent, and more ambitious than ordinary
scientists and engineers. Moreover, I spoke only with
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university graduates, although 41 percent of Chinese S&T
personnel are vocational school graduates (WHITE PAPER 1986:
317).
Fourth, this sample was too small to note any differences
in attitudes between the men and women scientists and
engineers. The two women in the sample claimed, however, never
to have experienced any discrimination in their education or
employment, despite reports of widespread discrimination
against women in job assignments (ORLEANS 1986: 4; CHINA DAILY
1987b). These two women, it might be noted, were not in
traditional well-established fields, but in emerging fields in
which talent is especially scarce.
Finally, I could not help but notice the preponderance of
persons from Shanghai in my sample. This was not a complete
surprise because most of the PRC students and visiting scholars
that I have met at U.S. universities in recent years are also
from Shanghai. Are so many from Shanghai because that city
produces the most university graduates, or because it produces
the best graduates? Do Shanghai universities and work units
provide so many opportunities for foreign study because they
are the best funded and most prestigious, or do Chinese from
Shanghai tend to have the most overseas connections?
In conclusion, my sample of interviewees was not intended
to be extensive or complete because of the time and resource
constraints imposed on this project. Moreover, I realized from
the beginning that PRC scientists and engineers studying or
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working in the U.S. are not typical of their cohort back in
China. This sample was intended only to provide a further
glimpse into the causes of mismatches between China's
scientists and technicians and jobs than might can be had from
the Chinese press.
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